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13 Hobbes and the Cause of
Religious Toleration
Many readers of Leviathan will be surprised by the suggestion that in
that work Hobbes might have been – in intention and in act – a friend
of religious toleration. Who could be further removed, on this issue,
from that ‘saint of liberalism’,1 John Locke? Locke’s Letter on Toler-
ation sought a kind of separation of church and state,2 arguing that
each of these institutions has its own areas of legitimate concern,
that the state exists to protect our temporal interests, and is entitled
to use force to do so, but that it cannot use coercion to advance our
spiritual interests. These are the province of the churches, which
also cannot use force to achieve their ends. Since a saving faith must
be uncoerced, they must rely on persuasion. Hobbes is certainly not
a saint of liberalism in that sense. He advocates, not a separation of
church and state, but a subordination of the church to the state.
On Hobbes’s view it is an essential prerogative of the sovereign
to determine what books may be published and what doctrines may
be taught, in public gatherings generally, but especially in the uni-
versities and the churches.3 He thinks the sovereign must not only
see that doctrines harmful to peace are not taught but also ensure
that doctrines promoting his absolute authority are taught. The
Hobbesian sovereign is meant to exercise a very broad control of
public discourse, in philosophy, in science, in politics and morals,
This is a revised version of a paper presented to the Eric Vo¨gelin Soci-
ety, at the meeting of the American Political Science Association in
Washington, September 2005. I’m indebted to the participants in that ses-
sion for their comments on the earlier version, and to Patricia Springborg
and Liz Anderson for their comments on subsequent versions.
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and especially in religion. The fundamental purpose of his control is
to prevent sedition.
Among the doctrines Hobbes regards as particularly seditious are
two that many Christians in his day would have thought firmly based
in Scripture: that ‘faith and sanctity are not to be attained by study
and reason, but by supernatural inspiration or infusion’ (Lev., xxix, 8,
169/212–13) and that ‘whatsoever a man does against his conscience
is sin’ (Lev., xxix, 7, 168–9/212).4 Since the rights of conscience were
in Hobbes’s day often invoked in favor of toleration, his rejection
of the latter doctrine would be particularly troubling to its contem-
porary advocates. The sovereign’s many rights include the right to
determine which books of Scripture are canonical (Lev., xxxiii, 1,
199–200/250–1), the right to decide how we should interpret pas-
sages in those books (Lev., xxxiii, 25, 206/261), and the right to give
legal force to the teachings of Scripture (Lev., xxvi, 41, 149–50/187–
89; Lev., xxxiii, 24, 205–6/259–61).
So it was a pleasant paradox, about twenty years ago, when Alan
Ryan published two papers suggesting that Hobbes might be more
friendly to toleration than we generally give him credit for being.5
Among other things, Ryan noted that Hobbes’s position leaves room
for a large measure of toleration because his argument for imposing
uniformity is essentially a pragmatic, political one. There are some
opinions in religion that are dangerous to the peace and order of
society, either because they may encourage subjects to rebel against
their sovereign – notably the doctrine that we must obey God rather
than man (Acts 5:29) – or because they may cause subjects to divide
into factions and kill one another, as had frequently happened in
the wars of religion of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.6 The
sovereign may, and should, vigorously repress the expression of those
opinions. But he should not care what people think privately, so long
as they keep it to themselves and do not act antisocially.7 Unlike the
true believer, whose goal is to save souls, the Hobbesian sovereign
looks only to temporal ends and can justify imposing uniformity just
to the extent that doing so helps him to achieve those temporal ends.
Not only does the pragmatic nature of Hobbes’s argument leave
room for a large measure of toleration, it also leads Hobbes to endorse
leaving people alone when it is not necessary, for the good of the
commonwealth, to interfere with them. The duty of the sovereign
is to seek the well-being of his people (Lev., xxx, 1, 175/219). One
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CCOL0521836670.014
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Michigan Library, on 31 Mar 2020 at 21:11:14, subject to the Cambridge Core
P1: SBT
0521836678c13 CUNY719/Springborg 0 521 83667 8 May 18, 2007 4:24
Hobbes and the Cause of Religious Toleration 311
aspect of that well-being is what Hobbes calls, in The Elements of
Law, ‘commodity of living’. Part of commodity of living is liberty,
by which Hobbes there means ‘That there be no prohibition without
necessity of any thing to any man which was lawful to him in the law
of nature, that is . . . , that there be no restraint of natural liberty, but
what is necessary for the good of the commonwealth’.8 He reaffirms
this view in Leviathan, when he argues that the sovereign has a duty
to make only good laws, where the goodness of a law is measured by
its necessity for the good of the people. (Lev., xxx, 21, 182/229)
Hobbes claims in the Dedicatory Letter to Leviathan that he has
tried to find a middle course between those who seek too much
liberty and those who seek too much authority. Most readers of
Leviathan have felt that he tilted too far in the direction of author-
ity, and that is an understandable reaction to the positions described
at the beginning of this paper. But to do Hobbes justice we must
acknowledge those aspects of his thought that bring him closer to
the center. One reason why Hobbes rejects repression of thought and
expression beyond what is necessary for the good of the common-
wealth is that he thinks it is counterproductive, provoking bitter-
ness and resentment, and undermining the loyalty of the sovereign’s
subjects. In Behemoth he writes: ‘A state can constrain obedience,
but convince no error, nor alter the minds of them that believe they
have the better reason. Suppression of doctrine does but unite and
exasperate, that is, increase both the malice and power of them that
have already believed them’.9 This may exaggerate the limits on the
state’s ability to produce uniformity in the area of religion. The Span-
ish and Portuguese Inquisitions, with the help of ‘the secular arm’,
seem to have been pretty effective in preventing the Reformation
from spreading to those countries. But in the passage quoted Hobbes
is clearly thinking of the results of Archbishop Laud’s attempts to
suppress the teaching of predestination and to impose the Book of
Common Prayer on the Scots.10
Where Ryan argued merely that Hobbes was more favorable to
toleration than we might have thought, Richard Tuck subsequently
claimed that Leviathan is actually ‘a defense of toleration’.11 This
probably goes too far, at least if we restrict ourselves to the first pub-
lished version of Leviathan, the English edition of 1651. Later we
will look at the passage in that work that constitutes Tuck’s best
evidence for this proposition. But Tuck reminds us, usefully, that
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between 1666 and 1670 Hobbes wrote a number of works – the Dia-
logue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of
England, the Appendix to the Latin Leviathan, the Historical Narra-
tion Concerning Heresy, Behemoth, and the Historia Ecclesiastica –
in which he argued that since the Long Parliament abolished the
High Commission, there was no basis in English law for the prose-
cution of heresy.12 He also implied rather strongly that there should
not be. This implication surfaces, for example, in the conclusion of
Hobbes’s discussion of the Nicene Creed: ‘The things the Fathers say
outside Sacred Scripture in their individual explanations of the faith
[e.g., in the decisions of church councils, like that held at Nicaea]
do not oblige Christians, each of whom ought to search out his own
salvation in Sacred Scriptures, not at another’s risk, but at his own,
very great risk’.13 Similarly in the second chapter of the Appendix
Hobbes invokes the parable of the weeds in the wheat of Matthew
13:27–30 to show that the punishment of heresy should be left to
God at the last judgement.14
These positions would surely exclude the imposition on the whole
population of the Nicene Creed, a move contemplated in the Act
of Uniformity considered by Parliament in 1667. Tuck argues that
in opposing the intolerant policies advocated by the Anglicans and
Presbyterians in the late 1660s, Hobbes was siding with ‘the former
Independents and other theological radicals from the Civil War years’
and that this aligned him politically with ‘the Cabal’, the group of
five government ministers, led by Shaftesbury, who replaced Claren-
don as Lord Chancellor in 1667. Since Locke was then working as
an aide to Shaftesbury, and beginning to develop his own defence
of toleration,15 this made Hobbes and Locke political allies, at least
with respect to the issue of religious toleration!
Tuck also reminds us that during this period from 1666–1670
Hobbes had his own personal reasons to fear religious intolerance.
Beginning in the fall of 1666, and as late as the summer of 1668,
Parliament was discussing, off and on, two forms of a bill ‘against
atheism and profanity’. The stronger of the two versions explicitly
made it an offence, punishable by imprisonment or banishment,
to deny such doctrines as the Trinity, or God’s providence, or the
divine authority of the books accepted as canonical in the Church
of England, or the immortality of the soul, or the eternal torment of
the wicked in hell. Each of these doctrines was one Hobbes might
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plausibly be thought to have denied in Leviathan. Indeed, the com-
mittee in the House of Commons considering the earlier (and weaker)
of the two bills was empowered to collect information specifically
about Leviathan, and there was a motion in the House that Leviathan
be burned. Aubrey says Hobbes heard a report that ‘some of the
bishops made a motion to have the good old gentleman burned for a
heretic. Which he hearing, feared that his papers might be searched
by their order, and he told me that he had burned part of them’.16
Hobbes himself was summoned to appear before a committee of
the House of Lords in 1667. In the end these bills did not pass, and
Hobbes was not burned.17 But these events must have given him a
good scare, and a strong motive to support the toleration of religious
difference.
Hobbes’s support for toleration is not, however, entirely a response
to the events of the late 1660s. Even in the English Leviathan of
1651 Hobbes had criticized the Roman Church’s condemnation of
Galileo as presupposing a misunderstanding of the purpose of Scrip-
ture, which in his view was to teach us how to achieve the Kingdom
of God, not what the nature of the universe is (viii, 26, 38–9/45–6).
Moreover, in chapter xliii of Leviathan he had argued that the path
to the Kingdom is easy:
All that is necessary to salvation is contained in two virtues: faith in Christ
and obedience to laws. The latter of these, if it were perfect, were enough
to us. But because we are all guilty of disobedience to God’s law, not only
originally in Adam, but also actually by our own transgressions, there is
required at our hands now, not only obedience for the rest of our time, but
also remission of sins for the time past, which remission is the reward of our
faith in Christ. (Lev., xliii, 3, 322/398–9)
There are two things to notice about these requirements. First,
you might think the reference here to obeying God’s law implies
that salvation requires adherence to the commandments of Scripture.
But it does not. The law of Moses is not binding on Christians, and
Jesus, according to Hobbes, issued no new commandments. He only
counseled us to obey the laws we are already subject to [i.e., ‘the
laws of nature and the laws of our several sovereigns’ (Lev., xliii, 5,
322/399–400)]. Counsel is not command, and so lacks an essential
feature of laws.18 If we obey the laws of the state and the laws of
nature – where the latter require action only if there is reasonable
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assurance of reciprocity (Lev., xv, 36, 79/99) – we will have satisfied
the requirement of obedience to laws.
Second, the faith in Christ Hobbes thinks required is not a belief
that Jesus was divine. It is a belief that Jesus is the Christ, which
Hobbes interprets to mean that Jesus was the Messiah, ‘the king
God had before promised, by the prophets of the Old Testament, to
send into the world to reign (over the Jews and over such of other
nations as should believe in him) under himself eternally, and to give
them that eternal life which was lost by the sin of Adam’ (Lev., xliii,
11, 324/402). If, to be saved, we had to assent to ‘all the doctrines
concerning Christian faith now taught (whereof the greatest part
are disputed) . . . there would be nothing in the world so hard as to
be a Christian’ (Lev., xliii, 14, 325/403). But the faith necessary for
salvation is easy: the thief who died with Jesus on the cross showed
that he had it when he testified to his belief that Jesus was the king;
and the Jews of Jesus’ time could have had it, simply by accepting
that Jesus was the Messiah foretold in the Old Testament (Lev., xliii,
15, 326/403–4).
This kind of minimalism about the requirements for salvation had
been a popular argument for toleration ever since the mid-sixteenth
century, when Castellio protested against the burning of Servetus
in Geneva for having propagated his heretical interpretation of the
doctrine of the Trinity. Though Hobbes probably carries doctrinal
minimalism further than Castellio would have, he does have some
claim to being an advocate of ‘Erasmian liberalism’,19 which empha-
sizes conduct at the expense of doctrine, suspends judgement on
many theological issues, and insists that the faith required for salva-
tion is simple and uncontroversial, at least among Christians. This
move tends to undermine the claim that the suppression of heresy is
necessary, not to save the heretics, but to save those so-far-faithful
Christians whom the heretics might lead astray if they were permit-
ted to defend their heresies, a goal that both Aquinas and Calvin had
invoked to justify the suppression of heresy.20
But there is another side of Leviathan, which we have not yet
considered. Insofar as Hobbes is an Erasmian liberal, he stands with
Castellio, Locke and those moderate Enlightenment figures who
attempted to make a case for religious toleration within the frame-
work of Christianity, broadly construed. But though Hobbes has one
foot in the moderate mainstream of the Enlightenment, he has the
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other in the radical Enlightenment Jonathan Israel describes in his
book of that title.21 By the ‘radical Enlightenment’ Israel understands
an intellectual movement that,
whether on an atheistic or deistic basis, rejected all compromise with the
past and sought to sweep away existing structures entirely, rejecting the
Creation as traditionally understood in Judeo-Christian civilization, and
the intervention of a providential God in human affairs, denying the pos-
sibility of miracles, and reward and punishment in an afterlife, scorning all
forms of ecclesiastical authority, and refusing to accept that there is any
God-ordained social hierarchy, concentration of privilege or land-ownership
in noble hands, or religious sanction for monarchy. (pp. 11–12)
Israel thinks that Spinoza played a central role in this movement,
but denies that Hobbes was comparably important (p. 159). I think
he is right about Spinoza, but wrong about Hobbes.22
It is true, of course, that Hobbes is not openly atheistic or deistic,23
and he certainly does not want to sweep away existing structures
entirely. But then Spinoza’s own religious position is ambiguous
enough that some readers have thought he was a Christian.24 And
like Hobbes, Spinoza used secular arguments to defend the political
structures that existed prior to the crises of his day. (The difference
is that in the Netherlands of 1670 the status quo Spinoza defended
was republican, not monarchical.) The affinities between Hobbes
and Spinoza are really quite deep. It is true that Hobbes is not as bold
as Spinoza in what he says about the creation. Spinoza clearly com-
mits himself to the eternity of the world (Ethics I, Prop. 28). Hobbes’s
official teaching rejects the eternity of the world, but in his ‘rejec-
tion’ Hobbes mocks the arguments of those who use the paradoxes
of infinity to show that the world must have had a beginning: ‘Do
not those who in this way take away the eternity of the world also,
by the same act, take away the eternity of the world’s maker?’25
Because the arguments of the creationists involve the concept of
infinity, which Hobbes says is beyond our comprehension, philoso-
phers cannot settle this question by using natural reason. So he con-
tents himself with affirming creation out of respect for Scripture and
the customs and laws of his country. But since he holds that Scrip-
ture’s aim is not to inform us about the nature of the world, only to
show us how to achieve salvation (Lev., viii, 26, 38–9/45), what this
amounts to is that he accepts creation because the customs and laws
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of his country do so. If the customs and laws of his country required
acceptance of the eternity of the world, presumably that is what he
would accept.26
Again, whereas Spinoza clearly denies that God is providential,
when he denies his God intellect, will, and ends (Ethics I, Prop. 31 and
App.), Hobbes does not clearly deny divine providence. But he does
interpret that doctrine in a way that would offer no comfort to the
afflicted. As Hobbes reads the Book of Job (Lev., xxxi, 6, 188/236–7),
God’s existence gives us no reason to think that what happens in the
world is part of the plan of an omnipotent, omniscient and loving
God, and that therefore there must be a good reason for whatever
suffering occurs. God’s absolute power makes whatever he chooses
to do right, even if it involves inflicting horrendous suffering on
an innocent man. There is a tension between this theology and the
covenant theology of the Pentateuch, a tension that emerges clearly
in Leviathan. Covenant theology commits God to rewarding obe-
dience and punishing disobedience; Hobbes’s God cannot be bound
by any promises.27 Moreover, not only would Hobbes’s doctrine that
God has no ends28 make it difficult to defend a traditional concep-
tion of divine providence, it also, given Hobbes’s definitions of law
and command, entails the spinozistic heresy that God cannot be a
lawgiver.29
Again, whereas Spinoza denies that miracles are even metaphysi-
cally possible,30 Hobbes does not deny that they occur. He just cau-
tions us to be wary of believing in any particular miracle:
Such is the ignorance and aptitude to error generally of all men (but especially
of them that have not much knowledge of natural causes and of the nature
and interests of men) as by innumerable and easy tricks to be abused. . . . If
we look upon the impostures wrought by confederacy, there is nothing how
impossible soever to be done, that is impossible to be believed. For two men
conspiring, one to seem lame, the other to cure him with a charm, will
deceive many; but many conspiring, one to seem lame, another so to cure
him, and all the rest to bear witness, will deceive many more.31
Though Hobbes’s argument here – like Hume’s and unlike Spinoza’s –
is epistemological rather than metaphysical, he does anticipate
Spinoza insofar as he suggests that someone who understood natural
causes would be much less easily taken in by false tales of miracles.
Spinoza’s views on immortality are more difficult to work out.
Early in the Ethics he says that mind and body are one and the
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same thing, conceived under different attributes (II, Prop. 21, Schol.),
which would seem to entail that the mind must die with the body.
Later he says that there is something of the mind that is not destroyed
with the body, but is eternal (V, Prop. 23). But whatever part of
the mind is eternal – apparently it is the part that has intellectual
knowledge of God or Nature – lacks any memory of a life in the
body. Since Spinoza makes memory essential to personal identity
(IV, Prop. 39, Schol.), this entails a denial of personal immortality.
Spinoza construes hell as something lived here on earth, when we
are subject to such passions as sadness, despair, envy, terror, and the
like.32 Hobbes does not deny immortality. But consistently with his
materialism, he conceives of the life eternal as enjoyed, not by an
immaterial soul, but by a resurrected body, which will live in a ter-
restrial paradise (Lev., xxxviii, 1–5, 238–42/301–5). The wicked do
not have eternal life and are not punished for eternity. After their
‘first death’, they are punished, but not forever. When they have suf-
fered enough, they die a ‘second death’ (i.e., are annihilated).33
Among Hobbes’s many affinities with Spinoza, one of the most
important is his role in the emerging science of biblical criticism.34
Not only does Hobbes anticipate Spinoza in denying the Mosaic
authorship of the Pentateuch, he also anticipates his view that all
the books of the Old Testament were compiled many centuries after
the events they describe. He even anticipates Spinoza in identify-
ing the post-exilic priest, Ezra, as the person who probably put the
central historical books of the Bible into the form in which we have
received them (Lev., xxxiii, 19, 203/255–6). But Hobbes is not as
bold as Spinoza in the conclusions he explicitly draws from his bib-
lical criticism. Nowhere does he write anything as blunt as Spinoza’s
claim that ‘the word of God is faulty, mutilated, corrupted and incon-
sistent, that we have only fragments of it, and that the original text
of the covenant God made with the Jews has been lost’.35 Indeed,
Hobbes makes a point of denying that the temporal gap between the
events recorded and the earliest surviving records of those events
casts doubt on the records’ accuracy: ‘I see not therefore any rea-
son to doubt but that the Old and the New Testaments, as we have
them now, are the true registers of those things which were said and
done by the prophets and apostles’ (Lev., xxxiii, 20, 204/257). But his
grounds for this conclusion are odd.
Hobbes acknowledges that the interval between the events
recorded and the texts describing those events is not as great in the
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case of the New Testament books as it is in the case of the Old.
The authors of the New Testament books all lived in the age of
the apostles (i.e., in the mid-first century). But then he observes that
there was a significant temporal gap between the writing of the New
Testament books and their inclusion in the canon, that is, the author-
itative determination of their sacred status and their official recom-
mendation to Christian congregations. He dates their acceptance as
canonical as having occurred near the end of the fourth century. Dur-
ing that gap there were only a few copies of the works available, and
they were in the hands of ambitious priests, who wished to exercise
control over the emperors and were willing to use pious fraud to gain
that control. But although these priests had both the motive and the
opportunity to alter the texts to their liking, Hobbes writes,
I am persuaded they did not therefore falsify the Scriptures (though the copies
of the books of the New Testament were in the hands only of the ecclesias-
tics), because if they had had an intention to do so, they would surely have
made them more favourable to their power over Christian princes and civil
sovereignty than they are. (xxxiii, 20, 204/257)
In ‘“I Durst Not Write So Boldly”’ (p. 569) I argued that Hobbes was
being ironic here. He put together an argument that we might natu-
rally think led to one conclusion – that our present texts of the Old
and New Testaments do not provide a reliable record of the things
said and done by the prophets and apostles – but then denied that
conclusion, for reasons we should not find, and are not expected to
find, convincing. I called this ‘suggestion by disavowal’. The author
suggests a heretical conclusion but avoids having to take responsi-
bility for it by giving us bad reasons for denying that it follows from
his premises. A general skepticism about the accuracy of Scripture
as a record of what the prophets and apostles said and did would
serve Hobbes’s purposes by diminishing the authority of Scripture
as a basis for belief, thereby weakening a principal ground alleged
for disobedience to the sovereign. Moreover, since scriptural texts
affirming the necessity of correct belief for salvation – like John 3:16–
18 – are also a crucial part of the case for punishing heresy, dimin-
ishing the authority of Scripture also serves the cause of religious
toleration.
One reason I thought Hobbes was being ironic was that his pro-
fessed reason for accepting the counterconclusion (i.e., for thinking
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that the present texts of the Old and New Testaments do provide a
reliable record of the events they describe) was patently insufficient
to support that conclusion. Is deliberate alteration of the text the
only way error could have crept in? Might not the scientific igno-
rance or credulity of the authors have led them to treat as miracu-
lous events that had a natural explanation? And even if the priests
who preserved the texts of the New Testament did not deliberately
alter them to make them more favorable to their temporal power,
what assurance does that give us that those who were responsible
for writing and transmitting the texts of the Old Testament gave us
a true register of what happened many centuries before they wrote?
The fact that one group of priests did not alter the texts in their
care does nothing to show that another group of priests, who had
the disadvantage of living long after the events their texts described,
were both able and willing to transmit an accurate account of those
events.
Recently Noel Malcolm has considered the possibility of inter-
preting this passage ironically, and cautioned that we cannot decide,
on the basis of this passage alone, what Hobbes’s intentions are. He
notes that Bellarmine had used a similar argument against the possi-
bility that the rabbis had corrupted the text of the Old Testament. ‘If
they had wished to falsify the holy Scriptures out of hostility to the
Christians’, Bellarmine wrote, ‘they would doubtless have removed
the main prophecies [of the Messiah]’.36 No one would accuse Bel-
larmine here of suggestion by disavowal. Malcolm does not flatly
reject the ironic interpretation, but suggests that if we accept it, we
must do so on the basis of larger contextual considerations, such as
Hobbes’s ‘naturalistic treatment of miracles and prophecy, and his
epistemological blocking of any transmission of divine revelation
from one human being to another’. Malcolm’s caution is judicious.
I would agree that these contextual considerations are very helpful
in, and perhaps necessary for, determining the meaning of this pas-
sage. But a dogged defender of a nonironic interpretation of the text
is apt to question our interpretation of the passages about miracles,
prophecy and revelation too. So it may be useful to see what more
can be mined from this passage.
We might begin by noting one disanalogy between Bellarmine’s
argument and Hobbes’s. Many copies of the Hebrew Bible, not only in
the original language, but also in Greek translation, were circulating
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by the time the Christians became a force the rabbis had to con-
tend with. So it would not have been as easy for the rabbis to falsify
their Scriptures as Hobbes insists it was for the Christian clerics.
(This weakens Bellarmine’s argument. Does it strengthen Hobbes’s?)
Moreover, Hobbes’s argument should raise the following question
in the minds of critical readers: if the priests had the motive and
the opportunity to falsify the texts, what stopped them from doing
so? We might have hoped that they would have been inhibited by
moral scruples about tampering with the word of God. But Hobbes
has blocked that response in advance by telling us that these priests
‘thought such frauds as tended to make the people more obedient to
Christian doctrine to be pious’.
Hobbes cites no evidence for this claim, but if challenged to do so,
he might have offered the example of the ‘Johannine comma’, that
variation of 1 John 5:7–8, which imports a clear statement of the
doctrine of the Trinity – the only clear statement of that doctrine
in the New Testament – into a passage that evidently did not orig-
inally contain it. In the sixteenth century Erasmus had created an
uproar when he omitted the Johannine comma from the first printed
edition of the Greek New Testament, on the ground that he did
not find it in the Greek manuscripts available to him. When crit-
ics protested the omission, Erasmus offered to restore the passage
if someone could show him a Greek manuscript that contained it.
A manuscript containing it was accordingly produced, and in subse-
quent editions of the New Testament Erasmus restored the passage,
though his annotation expressed doubts about the authenticity of
the new manuscript. And indeed, it is now generally regarded as a
forgery, produced for the occasion.37 Given Hobbes’s intense inter-
est in the doctrine of the Trinity, it seems likely that he would have
known about this case, though he does not challenge the authentic-
ity of the Johannine comma when he discusses it in chapter xlii of
Leviathan, preferring instead to interpret it in a way consistent with
his position on the Trinity.38
Reflection on this case also points up another weakness in
Hobbes’s argument for his counterconclusion: when the priests
transmitted the text, they might have been more concerned with
theological issues than with claiming authority over rulers. As we
have learned since Hobbes’s day, there are numerous examples where
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the texts of our earliest manuscripts of the New Testament seem
to have been deliberately altered to make them favor one side over
another in the disputes about Jesus’ nature which bitterly divided his
followers in the first centuries after his death.39 At least by the time
he wrote the Latin Leviathan Hobbes was well informed about the
many ‘heresies’ in the early church, and knew that the term heresy
(hairesis) did not acquire its pejorative meaning until after the early
church councils defined what orthodoxy comprised.40
An ironic reading of Hobbes’s conclusion thus seems to me per-
fectly in order, although I would not dream of imputing irony to the
similar argument in Bellarmine. What makes the difference? Cer-
tainly context is important. Hobbes is an author in whom we fre-
quently find passages that seem to flirt with heresy, if they do not
embrace it outright.41 Bellarmine is not. But the contemporary recep-
tion of Hobbes is also important. Most of his contemporaries thought
Hobbes was highly unorthodox. We need to be able to account for
that reaction. A reading of Hobbes that acknowledges his frequent
use of irony helps us to do so.
One important affinity Hobbes had with Spinoza and other
authors of the radical Enlightenment is that he did ‘scorn all forms of
ecclesiastical authority’. Aubrey quotes a suggestive remark made to
him by Edmund Waller: ‘that what was chiefly to be taken notice of
in [Hobbes’s] elegy was that he, being but one, and a private person,
pulled down all the churches, dispelled the mists of ignorance, and
laid open their priestcraft’.42 No doubt Waller exaggerated Hobbes’s
actual accomplishments when he said that. Hobbes did not in his
own time succeed in dramatically weakening the political power
of authoritarian religion, though he may in the long run have con-
tributed significantly to weakening it. But I do not think he much
exaggerated Hobbes’s goals. As we shall see, Hobbes is not opposed
to all churches, in the most general sense of the term ‘church’. But
he is opposed to churches that claim to exercise authority over us,
churches that make a sharp distinction between the laity and the
clergy, and whose clergy, in virtue of their presumed superior knowl-
edge of spiritual matters, claim the right to issue decrees it is unjust
to disobey, independently of the decrees of the sovereign.43 It is these
churches that pose a threat to the authority of the sovereign, and it
is these churches that must be ‘pulled down’.
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This agenda is most evident in Part IV of Leviathan, titled ‘The
Kingdom of Darkness’. Hobbes defines the kingdom of darkness as ‘a
confederacy of deceivers that, to obtain dominion over men in this
present world, endeavor by dark and erroneous doctrines to extin-
guish in them the light, both of nature and of the gospel, and so
to disprepare them for the kingdom of God to come’ (Lev., xliv, 1,
333/411). Hobbes also refers to the kingdom of darkness as the king-
dom of Satan and says that the darkest part of it consists of those who
reject Christ. He offers no evidence to suggest that non-Christians
are conspiring among themselves to obtain dominion over Chris-
tians. The members of this confederacy of deceivers whom he thinks
most dangerous – if we may judge by the attention he gives them –
are the leaders of the Roman Catholic Church, whose Pope claims,
as Christ’s vicar on earth, a right to the obedience of all Christians
(whether Catholic or not), a right, through his bishops, to crown kings
(Lev., xliv, 6–9, 335–7/413–15), and a right to release subjects from
their obligation to obey their king, if he is not diligent in purging his
country of heretics (Lev., xliv, 6–9, 335–7/413–15).
Still, it would be a mistake to think that Hobbes’s polemic against
the kingdom of darkness has only the Catholic Church as its tar-
get. Though he devotes what some readers may feel is an inordinate
amount of space in books III and IV of Leviathan to his campaign
against that church, he also makes it clear that he finds the Pres-
byterian clergy equally obnoxious: ‘The Presbytery hath challenged
[i.e., claimed] the power to excommunicate their own kings, and to
be the supreme moderators in religion, in the places where they have
that form of Church government, no less than the Pope challengeth
it universally’ (Lev., xliv, 17, 340–1/420–1). An attack on Presbyte-
rianism was not only an attack on the Church of Scotland. In 1647
the Westminster Assembly had approved and in 1648 Parliament
had ratified a common confession, intended to unite the Christian
churches of England, Scotland and Ireland.44 Although the political
power of the Presbyterians declined sharply after Pride’s Purge in
December 1648, the Church of England itself still contained many
Presbyterians.45
Hobbes’s fierce anticlericalism is not news, of course. But we
may not appreciate its relevance to the problem of religious toler-
ation. Hobbes views the clergy as an inherent threat, not only to the
authority of the king, but also to religious liberty. Clerics may be
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men of God, but they are still men, and one thing Hobbes thinks
is common to all men is ‘a perpetual and restless desire of power
after power, which ceaseth only in death’ (Lev., xi, 2, 47/58). If we
consider power in its broadest sense, as the present means to obtain
some future apparent good (Lev., x, 1, 41/50), there is nothing inher-
ently wrong with the desire for power. It is only rational to desire
the means to whatever else you may desire. But people do not differ
greatly in their natural ability to get what they want (Lev., xiii, 1,
60/74). Significant differences of power arise only when some men
are able to use their natural power to get others to do their bidding,
acquiring thereby a kind of power Hobbes calls ‘instrumental’ (Lev.,
x, 2–3, 41/50). Because people may differ greatly in their degree of
instrumental power, it can be much more dangerous than natural
power.
The clergy are particularly well placed to acquire instrumental
power. For another common feature of human nature is our igno-
rance of natural causes and, in particular, of the causes of our good
or ill fortune (Lev., xii, 1–6, 52/63–4). This ignorance makes us anx-
ious about the future (Lev., xii, 5, 52/63–4), credulous (Lev., xi, 23,
51/62) and thus prone to take things that happen accidentally as
good or evil omens. It disposes us to trust those who can plausibly
claim the power to foresee the future and to assist us in realizing our
goals (Lev., xii, 10, 54/66). These human weaknesses are among the
‘natural seeds’ of religion, which Hobbes defines as a ‘fear of invis-
ible powers, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publicly
allowed’ (Lev., vi, 36, 26/31). These natural seeds of religion would
not have blossomed into the organized religions we find around us
if there had not been men who cultivated them (Lev., xii, 12, 54/67).
Hobbes allows that some of these men – the founders of the true reli-
gion – cultivated the seeds of religion at God’s direction. Others – the
founders of the pagan religions – were acting on their own. But both
sorts of men, he contends, were motivated by a desire to make their
fellow men more obedient. More obedient to whom or what? The
English version of Leviathan attributes an apparently benign motive
to the founders of religions: ‘Both sorts have done it with a purpose
to make those men that relied on them the more apt to obedience,
laws, peace, charity, and civil society’. The Latin version says, less
amiably, that they have done it to make ‘their initiates more obedient
to themselves’.
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It is not surprising, then, that when Hobbes comes to analyze the
motivations that underlie the kingdom of darkness, he fixes on the
desire for power:
In those places where the Presbytery took that office [of administering the
government of religion], though many other doctrines of the Church of Rome
were forbidden to be taught, yet this doctrine (that the kingdom of Christ
is already come, and that it began at the resurrection of our Saviour) was
still retained. But cui bono? What profit did they expect from it? The same
which the Popes expected: to have a sovereign power over the people. (Lev.,
xlvii, 4, 382/478)
There is a similar warning in Hobbes’s discussion of prophecy:
Men had need to be very circumspect and wary in obeying the voice of man
that, pretending himself to be a prophet, requires us to obey God in that way
which he in God’s name telleth us to be the way to happiness.46 For he that
pretends [i.e., claims] to teach men the way of so great felicity pretends to
govern them (that is to say, to rule and reign over them), which is a thing that
all men naturally desire, and is therefore worthy to be suspected of ambition
and imposture, and consequently ought to be examined and tried by every
man before he yield them obedience. (Lev., xxxvi, 19, 230/290)
Hobbes does not, of course, deny that prophecy has occurred. He just
warns us to be suspicious of anyone who claims to be a prophet. And
his reasoning would apply equally to any minister who claimed to
be able to tell us the way to salvation.
Hobbes’s suspicion of the clergy has clear implications for the
Scriptures on which they base their authority. In his discussion of
faith earlier in Leviathan Hobbes had written: ‘When we believe that
the Scriptures are the word of God, having no immediate revelation
from God himself, our belief, faith and trust is in the church, whose
word we take, and acquiesce therein’ (Lev., vii, 7, 32/37). It seems rea-
sonable to infer from this that if we cannot trust the clergy, we cannot
trust that Scriptures are the word of God. That Hobbes affirmed the
antecedent of this conditional can hardly be doubted.
Earlier I said I did not think Hobbes wanted to ‘pull down’ all the
churches. My evidence for this is a remarkable passage toward the
end of the last chapter of Leviathan, where Hobbes gives an abridged
history of the Christian religion, with an emphasis on the problem
of religious liberty. In the beginning, he says, the people obeyed the
apostles out of reverence for their wisdom, humility, sincerity and
other virtues, not out of obligation. ‘Their consciences were free, and
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their words and actions were subject to none but the civil power’
(Lev., xvlii, 19, 384/481). But as the religion grew, the presbyters
(i.e., the leaders of the various groups of Christians), encountering
disagreement about fundamentals of the Christian message, felt the
need to settle on a uniform doctrine they would all agree to teach,
which they would expect their flocks to obey, on pain of excommu-
nication. This, Hobbes says, was ‘the first knot upon their liberty’.
Then as the number of presbyters grew, the presbyters in the chief
cities persuaded their provincial colleagues to accept their authority,
and took for themselves the title of bishop. ‘This was the second knot
on Christian liberty’. The final step was for the bishop of Rome, the
imperial city, with the assistance of the emperor, to acquire author-
ity over all the bishops of the empire. This ‘was the third and last
knot, and the whole synthesis and construction of the pontifical
power’.
Hobbes claims that the early history of the church has been
replayed in reverse in the history of England since the Reformation:
First the power of the Popes was dissolved totally by Queen Elizabeth, and
the bishops, who before exercised their functions in the right of the Pope,
did afterwards exercise the same in right of the Queen and her
successors. . . . And so was untied the first knot. After this the Presbyteri-
ans lately in England obtained the putting down of the episcopacy. And so
was the second knot dissolved. And almost at the same time the power was
taken also from the Presbyterians.47 And so we are reduced to the indepen-
dency of the primitive Christians, to follow Paul, or Cephas, or Apollos,
every man as he liketh best. Which, if it be without contention, and with-
out measuring the doctrine of Christ by our affection to the person of his
minister, . . . is perhaps the best.48
Tuck describes this passage as ‘the most passionate defense of tolera-
tion to be found in the book’. I think it constitutes his best evidence
for regarding the English Leviathan as a defence of toleration. But
when we take it together with the many other passages in which
Hobbes emphasizes the need for the sovereign to have the authority
to control people’s utterances and actions, and to try to control their
opinions, the overall evidence suggests a more nuanced verdict: that
the English Leviathan is more favorable to toleration than it might
appear, though not, on the whole, so favorable as the Latin Leviathan.
The passage under consideration (Lev., xlvii, 20, 385/481–2),
which Hobbes omitted from the Latin Leviathan, probably because
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it looked, after the Restoration, uncomfortably like support for
Cromwell, continues by explaining that the independency of the
primitive Christians is ‘perhaps the best’ because
there ought to be no power over the consciences of men but of the Word itself,
working faith in every one, not always according to the purpose of them that
plant and water, but of God himself, that giveth increase. And . . . because it
is unreasonable (in them who teach there is such danger in every little error)
to require of a man endued with reason of his own, to follow the reason of
any other man, or of the most voices of many other men (which is little
better than to venture his salvation at cross and pile).
Locke could hardly have said it better. At moments like this Hobbes
does indeed sound like a saint of liberalism.
Hobbes does not want to pull down all the churches, just the ones
that seek to dictate to their members what they should believe and
how they should act. Part of his way of doing that is to challenge
the standard interpretations of the scriptural texts on which they
base their claims to authority. Part of his way is to sow doubt about
the authority of Scripture itself. But the part of his procedure I have
concentrated on here is his debunking analysis of the psychology
that leads some men to seek authority over others, and others to be
foolish enough to give it to them. When he is in that mode, Hobbes
acts like a card-carrying member of the radical Enlightenment, bent
on destroying the influence of a clergy whose access to wealth, honor
and power depends on their being widely perceived as godly men,
who have a special insight into saving truths and only the good of
their flocks at heart. With Voltaire, he says: ‘Ecrasez l’infaˆme’.
To the extent that Hobbes had that project, and succeeded in it, he
served the cause of religious toleration. Wherever there is a clergy, in
the sense relevant here – a politically powerful group of men, whose
power depends on their ability to persuade their fellow men that
they have a privileged access to religious truth, which they can use
to help their fellow men attain the greatest possible good, and avoid
the worst possible evil – wherever there is a clergy in that sense, there
is a force that has a strong incentive to work against religious liberty
and is thus very apt to pose an obstacle to liberty. Diminishing the
power of such a clergy removes that obstacle.
Those who have a more benign view of the clergy than Hobbes
did, and are less willing than he for secular rulers to have unchecked
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CCOL0521836670.014
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Michigan Library, on 31 Mar 2020 at 21:11:14, subject to the Cambridge Core
P1: SBT
0521836678c13 CUNY719/Springborg 0 521 83667 8 May 18, 2007 4:24
Hobbes and the Cause of Religious Toleration 327
power, may object that it is often useful for there to be a force in
society which can oppose them. When I presented this paper in
Washington, Mary Keys observed that the Catholic Church had
played a valuable role in ending the communist domination of
Poland. I am sure there are many other cases where organized religion
has been a force for good in politics. Whether there are many cases
where the power of organized religion has advanced the cause of reli-
gious liberty is another matter, about which I am not so sanguine.
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by W. Molesworth (London: J. Bohn, 1841), 259.
29. Briefly, the argument is that on Hobbes’s definition of a command (Lev.,
xxv, 2, 131–2/165–6), someone who commands something does so for his
own benefit. And on Hobbes’s definition of law (Lev., xxvi, 2, 137/173),
law is a command addressed to someone previously obliged to obey
the commander. But if God has no ends, he cannot act for his own
benefit, and so cannot issue commands, and so cannot be a lawgiver.
For further discussion see my ‘Religion and Morality in Hobbes’, in
Rational Commitment and Social Justice, Essays for Gregory Kavka,
ed. by Jules Coleman and Christopher Morris (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), 102–5.
30. In the Theological-Political Treatise, ch. 6. Part of Spinoza’s argument is
that, since God is normally thought to have been the author of the laws
of nature, he would be acting contrary to his own will if he interfered
with the operation of those laws.
31. Lev., xxxvii, 12, 236–7/298–9. The Latin reads ‘two wicked men con-
spiring’.
32. So far as I know, the only passage in which Spinoza discusses hell
occurs in the Short Treatise on God, Man and his Well-Being, II, xviii,
6 (Spinoza, Collected Works, Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1985), I, 128.
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33. Lev., xxxviii, 6–14, 242–5/305–9; xliv, 14–16, 339–40/418–20; xliv, 27–9,
345–46/426–9. Hobbes also deals with the doctrine of eternal torment
in the Appendix to the Latin Leviathan (i, 43–6, Curley edn, 506–7),
where to his usual scriptural arguments he adds the claim that God’s
infinite mercy would enable him, without injustice, to remit the eternal
punishment the wicked might deserve.
34. I have discussed the roles Hobbes and Spinoza played in this dis-
cipline in ‘Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece (I): Spinoza and the
Science of Hermeneutics’, in Spinoza, the Enduring Questions, ed.
by Graeme Hunter (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994). See
also Noel Malcolm’s ‘Hobbes, Ezra and the Bible’, in his Aspects of
Hobbes.
35. Theological-Political Treatise, xii, 1 (Gebhardt edition, III, 158, my
translation).
36. Malcolm, Aspects of Hobbes, 428.
37. For details, see Bruce Metzger and Bart Ehrman, The Text of the New
Testament, Its Transmission, Corruption and Restoration, 4th edition
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), ch. iii, or Bart Ehrman, Mis-
quoting Jesus, The Story Behind Who Changed the Bible and Why (San
Francisco: Harper, 2005), 78–83.
38. See Lev., xlii, 3, 267–9/334–6. Hobbes deleted this passage from the
Latin edition of Leviathan, but returned to the topic in his Appendix,
i, 87, Curley edn, 517. I pass over another notorious example of pious
fraud, the so-called Donation of Constantine, unmasked by Lorenzo
Valla in the fifteenth century. On Hobbes’ relation to Valla, see Gianni
Paganini’s ‘Thomas Hobbes e Lorenzo Valla,’ Rinascimento 39 (1999):
515–68.
39. See Bart Ehrman, The Orthodox Corruption of Scripture, The Effects of
Early Christological Controversies on the Text of the New Testament
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), or chapter 6 of his Misquoting
Jesus.
40. See the Latin Leviathan, Appendix, ii, 1–26, Curley edn, 521–6.
41. Hobbes’s treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity in the English
Leviathan (e.g., in xvi, 12, 82/103; xxxiii, 20, 204–5/258–9; and xlii,
3, 267–8/334–6) would be an example of what I take to be a clear
embrace of heresy, which required considerable backtracking in the
Latin Leviathan. See the annotation in the Curley edition of the pas-
sages cited earlier and Hobbes’s retraction in the Appendix, iii, 11–14,
Curley edn, 543.
42. Brief Lives, I, 358. For Spinoza’s similar view of the clergy, see the Preface
to his Theological-Political Treatise.
43. See the Appendix to the Latin Leviathan, iii, 27–8, Curley edn, 545.
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44. See Robert S. Paul, The Assembly of the Lord, Politics and Religion in
the Westminster Assembly and the ‘Grand Debate’ (Edinburgh: T. & T.
Clark, 1985), 518.
45. John Moorman writes, of the period immediately following the execu-
tion of Charles, that ‘the religious life of the country was in a state of
great confusion. Since the abolition of episcopacy there had been no
proper organization or control. Most of the incumbents were Presby-
terians, but a number were Anglicans at heart, who conformed under
protest, and a few were Independents. All that the government could do
was to issue an order in 1650 to say that everyone must attend some
place of worship or a place where religious exercises were held; but that
meant very little’. A History of the Church in England (London: Adam
and Charles Black, 1954), 243–4.
46. The Latin Leviathan here reads: ‘the way to eternal salvation’. Curley
edn, 290.
47. A reference, I take it, to the expulsion of the Presbyterian members from
the House of Commons in Pride’s Purge, December 1648.
48. Lev., xlvii, 20 (385/481–2). For the sake of readability, I omit, in the
first ellipsis, a significant parenthetical remark: ‘though by retaining
the phrase of jure divino, they were thought to demand it by immediate
right from God’. Hobbes is understating matters here. Not only were
the bishops thought to demand their authority ‘by immediate right from
God’, they did so demand it. And Hobbes knew this at least by the time
he wrote Behemoth. See pp. 56–7 in the Holmes edition.
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